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THE PURSUIT OF A BIGGER PIE:
CAN EVERYONE EXPECT A BIGGER SLICE?
Lucian A. Bebchuk*
I.

INTRODUCTION

This essay examines and rejects the consent argument, suggested by Professor Richard Posner in this issue,1 for the assignment of common-law entitlements according to the wealth maximization criterion (WMG). 2 The greater part of the essay, however,
explores a refined argument which seems to be the best argument
that can be made for the use of the WMC.
Posner supports any single application of the WMC to a given
common-law entitlement. His argument is based on the proposition
that any given wealth-maximizing (WM) rule is viewed ex ante by
all (or almost all) individuals as not worse than any alternative rule.
Posner's argument will be refuted simply by demonstrating that,
for most common-law rules, his proposition is incorrect: losers,
even judged ex ante, do exist, and possibly in large numbers.
The refined argument I shall consider supports a policy of consistent application of the WMC to common-law entitlements, but
not the adoption of any particular WM rule in isolation. Although
individuals may expect such a policy to result in some WM rules
which they deem undesirable, it is nevertheless asserted that every
individual can expect such a policy to be beneficial (or at least not
* S.J.D. and Ph.D. candidate, Harvard Law School and Harvard University Department of Economics. I am indebted to Professor Frank Michelman for his encour-

agement and advice throughout the development of this essay.
1.

Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common

Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ethical
Basis]. Posner's previous attempt to provide a normative basis for wealth maximiza-

tion is Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory].

2. See generally sources cited supra note 1. The wealth of society is the output
of all commodities (tangible and intangible) multiplied by their prices (explicit or
shadow). According to the WMC a given change is desirable if it increases social

wealth; among the possible assignments of a given entitlement, the one that
maximizes wealth should be chosen. The WMC is used as a surrogate for the Kaldor-

Hicks criterion. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion judges a given change as desirable if the
gainers could hypothetically compensate the losers out of the gains. When a given
change increases wealth, then, if prices are not altered by the change, it follows that
the gainers can compensate the losers.
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damaging) on the whole. Whether indeed everyone can expect a
bigger slice from the pursuit of a bigger pie is the subject of my inquiry. My findings are that some groups of individuals may expect
to be worse off if a WM policy as suggested by Posner is followed.
In particular, the bias of the WMC against the poor, which will be
demonstrated, suggests that the slice of the poor may well be expected to shrink under that policy.
The ultimate purpose of my inquiry, however, is not to oppose
WM rules altogether. I conceive the pursuit of wealth, appropriately qualified and constrained, to be normatively appropriate. I
further believe that the refined argument to be discussed may ultimately provide the normative basis for such a policy. The objective
of my inquiry is therefore to expose the problems that need to be
overcome if such an argument is to be accepted. These problems,
which require the rejection of the policy advocated by Posner,
should guide us in qualifying and limiting the application of the
WMC, so as to make use of that criterion just and desirable.
My examination of the refined argument focuses on two issues.
The first issue is the non-neutrality of the WMC. When entitlements are allocated according to the WMC, poor individuals
are in general less likely than wealthy individuals to be on the winning side. The bias arising from the use of willingness to pay
(rather than asking price) in Posner's version of the WMC is already well-known. 3 The major original contribution of this essay is,
I think, the demonstration that, even ignoring the use of offer
prices, and however small the value of the entitlement to be assigned, the WMC is inherently biased in favor of wealthier individuals. The bias of the WMC against the relatively poor, I suggest, is deeper and more pervasive than has been previously
recognized.
The second problem to which I wish to draw attention is that
an argument asserting that nobody is expected to be worse off under a WM policy must refer to a baseline-that is, to some
standard of comparison. Therefore, such argument must relate to
an underlying political theory which provides the necessary
baseline. I examine the effect of a WM policy in comparison to two
baselines-one which I suggest is congenial to Posner's approach,
and, the other, the present assignment of common-law entitlements. I conceive neither of these baselines as normatively appro3.

See, e.g., Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5 PHILOS-

OPHY & PuB. AFF. 3 (1975).
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priate, and that is why I consider my present inquiry to be an incomplete one.
The paper develops as follows. Section II refutes the proposition on which Posner's consent argument is based. Sections III-V
prepare the ground for the examination of the refined argument.
Section III describes the two causes of the non-neutrality of the
WMC. Section IV analyzes the two corresponding kinds of indeterminacy. It explains why the WM assignment of any entitlement,
however small its value, may well depend on the initial assignment of entitlements, and clarifies the case of fundamental rights.
Section V describes Posner's consent argument, appraises the different objections to it, and presents the refined argument. The refined argument is then examined in Section VI.
II.

SINGLE APPLICATION OF THE

WMC

Posner's consent argument is based on his assertion that ex
ante all (or almost all) individuals judge the WM assignment of any
given common-law entitlement as not worse than any alternative
assignment. 4 Posner makes his claim with reference to the example
of automobile accident liability. I will examine the validity of his
proposition first with regard to that specific example and then with
regard to common-law entitlements in general.
A.

Strict Liability v. Negligence

The negligence rule differs from the strict liability (SL) one in
that the costs of a non-negligent accident are borne by the pedestrian rather than by the driver. Therefore under the negligence
rule the costs of walking will be higher and those of driving lower
than under SL. I assume, following Posner, that negligence is the
WM rule-that is, that the sum of accident costs and accident avoid5
ance costs is lower under that rule.
Consider a move from SL to negligence. Such a move increases total walking costs, though by less (according to our assumption) than it reduces total driving costs. The increase in walking costs that a pedestrian faces ex ante, before he walks, is
composed of the expected costs of non-negligent accidents, and his
risk bearing costs, if such exist. 6 Posner claims that judged ex ante
4. The nature of Posner's consent argument and the general objections to it are
dealt with in section V infra.
5. Accident costs are composed of the expected accident costs, and the risk
bearing costs, if such exist.
6. If the pedestrian does not insure himself, he will ex post suffer either a

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

3

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[VCol. 8:671

pedestrians are fully compensated for the increase they face in
walking costs by the reduction in driving costs.
What information do individuals have in the position which
Posner refers to as ex ante? Obviously individuals cannot know
whether they will be victims of a non-negligent accident. Posner
allows them, however, to know the extent of their driving and
walking activities. 7 Take individuals who do not drive or who drive
very little. How are they to be compensated ex ante for the increase in walking costs they face as a result of a move to a negligence rule? Posner suggests that "they use other modes of
transportation-taxis or buses or subways . . . whose costs would
be by assumption higher under a system of strict liability, and
those costs, or a large fraction of them at least, would be borne by
the users." 8 This answer is not satisfactory.
Individuals indeed may consume driving activity, as well as
walking activity, indirectly. Therefore, evaluating the effect of a
given rule on an individual, his total consumption of the two activities, including the indirect components, 9 should be considered. I
grant Posner that all individuals consume both driving and walking
and thus bear costs of both activities. The thrust of the matter is,
however, that individuals vary in the proportion they consume
driving and walking. Assume, for example, that the same number
of driving and walking hours are consumed in the economy, and
that a move from SL to negligence reduces the cost of a driving
hour by $5 and increases that of a walking hour by $4. Any individual who consumes, both directly and indirectly, driving hours in a
number less than four-fifths of his consumed walking hours is
worse off, judged ex ante, under a negligence regime than under
an SL one. The negligence rule thus does not enjoy the ex ante
consent of such individuals. It is quite possible that the number of
these individuals is large, and indeed they may even be a majority
in the population.
greater loss or no loss at all, depending on whether or not he is a victim of a nonnegligent accident. If he is insured, his ex post and ex ante costs are identical. Of
course, ex post, those pedestrians who are not insured, and who are victims of a nonnegligent accident, will be worse off under negligence than under SL. Our focus,
however, is on the ex ante situation.
7. See section V-A infra. Posner's ex ante situation is an actual situation that
existed at some point in time before the occurrence of the accidents to which the
negligence rule is to apply.
8. Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 495.
9. The indirect consumption is to be computed along the methods developed
by Leontief. See V. LEONTIEF, THE STRucruRE OF THE AMERICAN ECONOMY

1919-1939 (2d ed. 1951).
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One notable factor which affects the number of nonconsenting
individuals is the ratio of the efficiency gains to the distributional
transfer between the two activities. The efficiency gains are the excess of the reduction in driving costs over the increase in walking
costs. The distributional transfer is the increase in walking costs-it
is the component of the reduction in driving costs which does not
reflect any social gain but a mere transfer between the two activities. The greater the ratio of the efficiency gains to the distributional transfer, the greater the asymmetry in consumption in favor
of the walking activity which is necessary to make an individual
worse off, judged ex ante, under negligence, and the smaller the
number of nonconsenting individuals. Some lack of consent is
likely to exist even if the efficiency gains are very large in relation
to the distributional transfer. However, if the sole assumption is
that negligence is the WM rule' 0 -that is, that efficiency gains
exist-the scope of ex ante objection to negligence may be very
large indeed.
B.

Common Law Rules in General

The question in the automobile accidents example was to
which activity--driving or walking-should an entitlement be assigned. The choice between SL and negligence is representative of
all situations in which a given entitlement has to be allocated between two parties (not in contractual relations) engaged in two activities. Activity here should be broadly interpreted to include also
passive existence at a given location and time. One major group of
such situations is those cases (the accidents example one of them)
where externality exists between two activities. The entitlement
with regard to that externality is then to be allocated between the
two activities. 11
In allocating an entitlement between two parties engaged in
two activities, the WMC dictates assignment to the party who ascribes the higher monetary valuation to the entitlement.' 1Such assignment maximizes the total value of the two activities. The lesson
of my analysis of the automobile accidents example is, however,
10.

At the present state of economic analysis of law, granting that the WM rule

is identified, we are far from being able to estimate empirically the ratio between
the efficiency gains and the distributional transfer. Researchers mainly seek, and often unsuccessfully, to identify the WM rule.
11. Since Coase's seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON.
1 (1960), the paradigm of externality between two activities has been very widely
used in the economic analysis of the common law.
12. See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 34-39 (2d ed. 1977).
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that whenever individuals vary in the proportion in which they
consume the two activities, the WM assignment, even judged ex
ante, creates losers as well as gainers.
The automobile accidents example seems to be one of the best
Posner could find to test his proposition. Both driving and walking
are widely used activities; thus presumably all individuals benefit,
at least indirectly, from a reduction in driving costs. Nevertheless,
I have demonstrated the likely lack of consent to the WM rule
even in that example. The existence of ex ante losers, possibly in
large numbers, is more apparent when one or both activities are
consumed only, or mainly, by a limited part of the population. This
is the case with regard to many common-law entitlements.' 3 The
greater the diversity in the proportions of consumption of the two
activities among individuals, and the smaller the efficiency gains
relative to the distributional transfer between the two activities,
14
then the greater the scope of ex ante objection to the WM rule.
The only significant group of situations in which WM rules
may be based on the ex ante consent of all parties involved is those
situations where the parties are in contractual relations. The use of
the WM rule increases the total pie available to the parties, a pie
which they share in the contract between them. 15 At the stage of
entering the contract, both parties usually benefit from an increase
in the total pie available for negotiations, and therefore at this
stage they will usually both consent to WM rules to govern their
future relations. The mechanism which enables both parties to enjoy a greater pie is the negotiation of the contract.
Posner's claim, in the second example he brings, that both
(rich) landlords and (poor) tenants may be said to have consented
to a rule enforcing leases 16 is thus, for most circumstances, correct.
He cannot, however, generalize from this example, as he does,1 7 to
13.

See, e.g., Rodgers v. Elliott, 146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888) (person is

hurt, because of his uncommon sensitivity, from the ringing of a bell); Fletcher v.
City of Aberdeen, 54 Wash. 2d 174, 338 P.2d 743 (1959) (blind man falls, because of
his blindness, into an excavation).

14. In the paradigm of externality between two activities, the distinction between ex ante and ex post position exists only when the externality is stochastic.
(E.g.,-a given pedestrian may or may not be a victim of an accident.) Where the externality is deterministic, the mere existence of litigation-that is, the lack of ex post

consent-is prima facie proof of the lack of ex ante consent.
15. See, e.g., Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CI. L. REV. 341 (1978);
Posner and Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An
Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1977).
16. Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 500.
17. Id.
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situations where the parties are not in contractual relations. In
these situations there is no mechanism which enables all parties to
benefit, even judged ex ante, from the bigger pie of the WM rule.
I exclude from now on the assignment of entitlements between parties in contractual relations from the scope of my
discussion of the consent argument. For these entitlements, the
application of the WMC may well be appropriate. Limiting my
analysis to entitlements between parties who are not in contractual
relations, I can proceed on the basis of the proposition that the application of the WMC to a given entitlement is likely to create ex
ante losers as well as gainers.
At this stage we can already reject Posner's positive theory
-that is, his explanation for judges adopting, as he suggests they
do, WM rules. I do not accept Posner's claim that judicial decisions can best be understood as a single-minded (possibly unconscious) pursuit of wealth maximization. Nevertheless, granting the
validity of Posner's descriptive claim, the interest group theory set
by him' 8 cannot explain such pattern. His explanation is based on
the proposition that "[the] distributive neutrality [of a WM rule] operates to reduce potential opposition,"' 19 and we have found this
distributional neutrality to be missing.
The concern of this paper is, however, with the normative
claim of wealth maximization. As far as such claim is based on ex
ante consent to the application of the WMC to any given commonlaw entitlement, which is the argument proposed by Posner, it has
been refuted. Most of the rest of this paper will be devoted to the
exploration and consequent refutation of a refined argument: that
though the application of the WMC to a single given entitlement
cannot be based on ex ante consent, there is such consent to a policy of consistent application of the WMC to common-law entitlements.

III. THE

NON-NEUTRALITY OF THE WMC

A. The ParadigmaticSituation
It has been demonstrated in the previous section that the application of the WMC to a given entitlement creates losers as well
as gainers. In this section I will show that the WMC is not neutral:
18. Id. at 502-06.
19. Id. at 505.
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some individuals are more likely than others to be on the losing
rather than on the winning side. In particular, I will propose that
the WMC is biased against the poor and in favor of the wealthy.
I will examine the following paradigmatic situation. The WMC
is employed to decide whether an entitlement X is to be assigned
to party A (rule A) or to Party B (rule B). A and B may, of course,
represent classes of parties similarly situated.
It will be helpful in the following discussion to distinguish between consumers and producers-that is, between a party which
uses the entitlement in a consumptive activity and a party which
uses it in a productive activity. It is, of course, possible for an individual to make both consumptive and productive use of a given
entitlement (e.g., the entitlement to his own labor). I will assume, however, for simplicity and without loss of generality, that
neither party A nor party B is acting in the dual capacity of consumer and producer.
A consumer is necessarily an individual; consumptive activity
is that which directly enhances his utility. A party who is a consumer represents all the individuals who engage in the corresponding consumptive activity using the considered entitlement. A producer may be a sole proprietorship (when the productive activity is
performed by an individual working on his own), a partnership, or
a corporation. The producer can be viewed as a firm, and the sole
proprietor, the partners, or the shareholders will be referred to as
the owners of the producing firm. The activity of the firm is aimed
at producing dollars. The gain of a producer from being granted an
entitlement will be transferred to (and will eventually enhance the
utility of) two groups of individuals: the owners of the producing
firm and its customers. The allocation of such a gain between these
two groups depends on the characteristics of the market for the
producer's output. Therefore, considering the assignment of an
entitlement to a party which is a producing firm, the party should
be viewed as representing in some proportion the owners of the
producing firm and its customers.
I assume, for simplicity and without loss of generality for the
arguments to follow, that individuals may be represented by party
A or B, but are not and do not expect to be represented by both
parties. Consequently, the choice of rule A over rule B makes all
individuals represented by party A better off and all individuals
represented by party B worse off. The case with regard to the
choice of rule B over rule A is parallel.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol8/iss3/9
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The three different forms, resulting from the consumer/producer distinction, which the paradigmatic situation may take, and
the nature of the inquiry into the neutrality of the WMC, can be
clarified by the following example. In the state of Economia, four

activities take place in the lands of the Wealth Valley: soybean
growing, mink breeding, picnicking, and horseback riding. There
are two classes of individuals in Economia-a rich class A and a
poor class B. Mink breeding and horseback riding are consumed
solely by individuals of type A, while soybeans and picnicking are
consumed only by individuals of type B. Unfortunately, not all
goes well in the Wealth Valley. Minks often escape, eat the soybeans, and bite the picnicking crowd. The horses trample the soybeans and frighten the picnickers.
Four entitlements, one with regard to each of the described externalities, need to be allocated between: (1) horseback riding and
picnicking (consumer v. consumer), (2) horseback riding and soybean growing (consumer v. producer), (3) picnicking and mink
breeding (consumer v. producer), and (4) mink breeding and soybean growing (producer v. producer). Imagine now that the judges
of Economia decide cases according to the WMC. At the end of
this section we will be able to make, on the basis of the information described, an educated guess regarding the likely assignment
of the four entitlements by the WMC.
B.

The Use of Offer Prices

Posner's formulation of the WMC employs offer rather than
asking prices-that is, the amount a party will be willing to pay for
a given entitlement rather than the amount the party will be asking
for the entitlement if it is initially assigned to him. This fact has at20
tracted the attention and criticism of many commentators.
As regards a consumer, his offer price for a given entitlement
may well be smaller than his asking price due to a "wealth effect."
The consumer's wealth is greater with the entitlement than without it-therefore his marginal utility of income may be smaller
and, consequently, the monetary valuation he ascribes to the
entitlement may be greater. The size of the "wealth effect" associated with the entitlement increases with its value. The "wealth ef20. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 3; Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD.
191 (1980). Baker discusses in detail the bias against the poor created by the use of

offer prices. Much of this subsection is a summary of his argument.
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feet" can be ignored when the value of the entitlement to the consumer is very small. As regards a producer, his monetary valuation
of a given entitlement depends only on the prices of the producer's
output and inputs. Therefore, as is the case in most situations,
when the allocation of the entitlement does not significantly affect
the price system, the producer's asking and offer prices may be
treated for practical purposes as identical.21
Recently Kelman proposed another reason, in addition to
"wealth effects," for divergence between offer and asking prices
of
consumers, a cause which may have an impact even with regard to
entitlements of insignificant value. 22 Kelman suggests that consumers, but not producers, treat differently "opportunity cost income" and "realized income": a consumer who retains an entitlement for which he could receive money (opportunity cost income)
does not feel as if he has spent actual money (realized income)
23
for that entitlement.

Whenever one of the parties A and B, between which the
entitlement is to be allocated, is a consumer, the use of offer prices
may thus affect the assignment dictated by the WMC. This effect is
not neutral; it is biased against the poor.
Assume first that both A and B are consumers. The use of offer rather than asking prices may well reduce the monetary
valuations of both parties. Baker suggests, however, that under
very plausible assumptions the wealth effect, when such effect exists, is likely to be smaller for the wealthier consumer. 24 That is
because for any given monetary valuation of the entitlement, the
proportional change in wealth which the entitlement comprises decreases as the consumer's wealth increases. Consequently, if one of
the consumers, say A, is wealthier, he is advantaged by the use of
offer prices-his chance to have the entitlement assigned to him is
improved.
Assume now that only one of the parties, say B, is a consumer, while the other, A, is a producer. The use of offer prices
21.

See Baker, supra note 3, at 15.

22. Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Theology in the
Coase Theorem, 52 S. CALIF. L. REV. 669 (1979).

23. Kelman brings the following example of the phenomenon he suggests. A
consumer, for whom $50 composes only a marginal increment to wealth, buys a new
color television and decides to keep his old set for which he could realize, net of
transaction costs, $50. If his old television were destroyed, he would not incur
(including transaction costs) $50 for a new television. Id. at 681.
24.

Baker, supra note 3, at 17-18.
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may well reduce the consumer's monetary valuation but not that of
the producer, thus giving the latter an advantage. The bias in favor
of producers is in turn translated into a bias against the poor. First,
as has been explained above, the monetary valuations of wealthy
consumers are likely to be reduced by the use of offer prices to a
lesser extent than those of poor consumers. Second, part of the
producer's gain is materialized by the owners of the producing
firm, and wealthy individuals have a disproportionate share of the
ownership of productive assets. To sum up, the use of offer prices
benefits producers at the expense of consumers; wealthy individuals are likely to contribute a smaller than proportionate share of the
consumers' losses, and to receive a larger than proportionate share
of the producers' gains.
One could try to avoid or limit the bias resulting from the use
of offer prices. First, the WMC can be reformulated so as to employ asking prices. The choice between offer prices and asking
prices is indeed arbitrary: the rich prefer the use of the first, the
poor the use of the latter. Thus, it can be argued that the use of
asking prices creates a bias against the wealthy (although such a
bias may be tolerated or even desired by some political theories).
Alternatively, the problem can be avoided by limiting the scope of
the WMC-restricting it, as Dworkin suggests, 2 5 to those entitlements where both tests-the one employing offer prices as well as
that utilizing asking prices-yield the same result. The rationale
behind such a restriction is that only if both tests yield the same
assignment is it free from the danger of being the result of an arbitrary and biased choice. Posner's choice of offer prices for his formulation of the WMC is rooted in his wish to deny any weight to
the preferences of individuals who have no money,2 6 a purpose
which we will find to have no justification.2 7
However, even when the problem of divergence between offer
and asking prices can be legitimately ignored, either in the context
of entitlements with small value, or because asking prices are
taken into account in one of the two ways described above, the
WMC does not prove to be a neutral criterion. As the following
subsection shows, there is in the WMC, even ignoring the biases
arising from the use of offer prices, a deeper, inherent, and unavoidable bias against the poor.
25.
26.

Dworkin, supra note 20, at 192.
See, e.g., Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 499.

27. See section VI-C infra.
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C. The Use of Monetary Valuations
Applying the WMC, we compute the outcome of a hypothetical auction, in which the parties compete for the considered
entitlement. The WMC assigns the entitlement to the party with
the higher bid. The parties' monetary valuations are used only to
compare the values attached by the parties to the entitlement.
These monetary valuations do not reflect any actual payment-the
WMC does not require the winning party to actually pay his bid. I
propose that the use of monetary valuations, in itself, creates a bias
against the poor.
I will assume in the arguments to follow that the parties' asking and offer prices can be considered for practical purposes as
identical-that is, that the value of the entitlement is sufficiently
small. These circumstances are assumed in order to examine the
bias created by the use of monetary valuations in the absence of,
and thus in isolation from, the biasing impact of the use of offer
prices. When this assumption does not hold, both biases exist and
work against the poor.
Consider first the situation in which both A and B are consumers and that one of them, say A, is wealthier. I will show that it
can be inferred from the mere wealth inequality that the entitlement is more likely to be assigned by the WMC to A than to B.
I first examine the way in which the monetary valuation ascribed by a model individual E to the entitlement X (that is, the
number of dollars he deems as equivalent to X) is affected by an
increase in E's wealth. E's monetary valuation of X is his rate of
substitution between X and dollars-that is, between X and the
composite commodity which is represented by money. Normally
we can expect the assumption of diminishing marginal rate of
substitution-a basic and empirically supported assumption in economic theory2 -- to hold for the entitlement X and the composite
commodity "money." Therefore, an increase in E's wealth increases
the number of dollars he is willing to substitute for the entitlement X.
Alternatively, rather than using the language of rate of substitution, the argument may be presented using that of marginal utility of income. 29 The marginal utility of income of an individual is
28. See, e.g., J. HIcKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL ch. 1 (1939).
29. The concept of utility plays, in this argument, merely an heuristic role in
comparing the benefits of one individual from X and from money. There is therefore
no need to assume that utility, or marginal changes in it, is measurable (even in principle), or comparable among individuals.
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the utility he derives from $1, and it is conceived to be, in general,
declining when the individual's wealth increases. 30 E's monetary
valuation of X is the utility he derives from X, divided by his marginal utility of income. An increase in E's wealth decreases his
marginal utility of income and therefore, assuming that the utility
he derives from X is not (or not significantly) diminished, increases
his monetary valuation of X.
Thus the monetary valuation which a given consumer (with
some given preferences) ascribes to the entitlement X can normally
be expected to increase when his wealth increases. Moreover, the
greater the increase in his wealth, the greater the expected increase in that monetary valuation. We can now return to the allocation of X between the consumers A and B, A being the wealthier
one. If A and B have the same preferences then (since A can be
viewed as B with an increased wealth) A's monetary valuation of X,
PA, will exceed that of B, PB. The greater the wealth inequality,
the greater the excess of PA over PB.
As A and B are different individuals and may differ in their
preferences, PB may still exceed PA if B's preferences for X are sufficiently stronger than those of A. Individuals do vary in their preferences. I assume, however, that individuals' preferences for X are
distributed independently of, or at least not negatively correlated
with, their wealth. Consequently, though it is possible for PB to exceed PA, it is nevertheless more likely that PA will exceed PB, and
therefore that the entitlement X will be assigned by the WMC to
A. Moreover, the greater the wealth inequality between A and B,
the greater the likelihood of PA exceeding PB, and the greater the
expected excess of PA over PB.
The described bias becomes apparent where there is great inequality in wealth. Assume that B has no or extremely little wealth,
while A is of average wealth. Assume also that the WMC uses asking prices so that B's lack of funds does not preclude him from
ascribing a monetary valuation to the entitlement. The preceding
analysis makes it clear that most entitlements are extremely unlikely to be assigned by the WMC to B. B's marginal utility of income is very large. A small sum will enhance B's utility greatly-it
may, for example, prevent starvation-and hence it will be
preferred by B to most entitlements. Since B is ready to sell most
30. "Most economists accept the principle of diminishing marginal utility of income as a theoretically plausible and empirically supported description of the individual's preference function." Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory,

supra note 1, at 131.
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entitlements for a very small amount, none of these entitlements
will be assigned to him by the WMC (nor, of course, will he receive his asking price).
Consider now the situation in which either party or both parties are producers. The monetary valuation a producer ascribes to
the entitlement depends on the customers' monetary valuations of
the producer's output. The customers' monetary valuations depend
in turn on their wealth in the way that has been described. Part of
the producer's gain from being granted the entitlement may, as has
been explained, reach his customers. To that extent, assigning the
entitlement to the producer is indeed granting it to the customers'
consumptive activity. Thus a conflict between a producer and a
consumer, or between two producers, can be translated, at least in
part, into a conflict between two classes of consumers. I have already shown that the WMC is biased against the poor when
allocating an entitlement between two consumptive activities.
This concludes the demonstration of the bias against the poor
inherent in the WMC. We may now come back to our Wealth Valley example. 31 It is clear from the analysis of this subsection that
the WMC will be biased in favor of the rich class A-that is, each
of the considered entitlements is likely to be assigned by the
WMC to the mink breeding or horseback riding activities rather
than to those of soybean growing and picnicking. Can the application of the WMC to those entitlements be then based on the
consent of the individuals of class B? I shall return to this question
in section VI.
IV.

A.

THE INDETERMINACY OF THE WMC

Self-Indeterminacy and General Indeterminacy

The WMC may well be indeterminate with regard to any
given entitlement, unless it is accompanied by some presumption
about the initial assignment of entitlements on the background of
which it is applied. By indeterminacy I mean that the WMC will
yield different results when applied to some pair of different initial assignments. 32 By initial assignment of entitlements I refer to
31. See p. 679 supra.
32. The proposition about the indeterminacy of the WMC is equivalent to the
proposition that the allocation evolving in a no transaction costs situation (allocation
which is Pareto efficient by definition) may vary for different initial distributions of
entitlements. These propositions are equivalent since the WMC dictates assigning a
given entitlement to the party who would hold it in the absence of transaction costs.
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all entitlements-both common-law and non-common-law entitlements. 33 The presumption that has to be made in order to eliminate the indeterminacy of the WMC with regard to a given
entitlement need not accurately specify the initial assignment. It
may merely limit the form the initial assignment may take-that is,
restrict the set of possible initial assignments so that the result of
the WMC will be the same for every initial assignment in that
4
set.

3

1. Self-Indeterminacy-The broad scope of the indeterminacy
of the WMC may best be understood by distinguishing between
tw6 ways in which the WMC may be indeterminate with regard to
a given entitlement X. The distinction is based on the kind of presumption that is necessary to eliminate the indeterminacy.
The first kind of indeterminacy, call it self-indeterminacy, is
where the initial assignment of X itself needs to be presumed. That
is, two initial assignments that differ only in the assignment of X
lead to different results of the WMC with regard to X. This is the
well-known "Scitovsky Paradox." 35 It is likely to appear only when
the value of the entitlement X is significant. It is this kind of indeterminacy on which the debate focused. 36 The dispute was not so
much about the possible existence of self-indeterminacy as about
the scope of this problem. Posner conceded that "it is theoretically
possible that the initial assignment of a good might determine its
ultimate assignment . . . especially where the good was a very

large part of the individual's wealth," but contended, however, that
this is a rare or even unrealistic phenomenon.3 7
2. General Indeterminacy-Leaving open the question of the
pervasiveness of self-indeterminacy, I wish to point out that there
is an additional kind of indeterminacy that was overlooked in our
33. The distinction between common-law and non-common-law entitlements is
discussed in section VI-A infra.
34. Thus entitlements may vary in the degree of indeterminacy of the WMC
with regard to them-that is, in the extent to which the set of possible initial assignments has to be restricted in order to make the WMC determinate with regard to the
given entitlement.
35. Scitovsky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REv. ECON.
STUD. 77 (1941).
36. See, e.g., Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 509, 519 (1980); Dworkin, supra note 20, at 192; Kronman, Wealth
Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 240-41 (1980);
Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 500-02; Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics,
and Legal Theory, supra note 1, at 108; Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 641, 648-49 (1980).
37. Posner, The Value of Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 243, 246 (1980).
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debate. Take a given entitlement X which is of small or even marginal value so that self-indeterminacy is highly unlikely to take
place. The WM allocation of X is still likely to depend on the presumed initial assignment, though that of other entitlements and not
that of X itself.
Whatever the value of X, large or marginal, the parties' monetary valuations of X depend, as has been demonstrated in the previous section, on the parties' wealth and on the price system and
therefore on the initial assignment as a whole. The impact of the
initial assignment on the monetary valuation of a consumer is apparent. Recall that most entitlements will not be assigned to a
given consumer who is very poor, and note that there is an initial
assignment in which he is in that condition (say, one in which no
entitlement is assigned to him). The initial assignment also shapes
the monetary valuation of a producer, though in a more subtle
way. The producer's monetary valuation depends on the price system, which depends on the initial assignment.
Thus, while the scope of self-indeterminacy is limited, the described second kind of indeterminacy, call it general indeterminacy, gives the presumption" employed about the initial assignment
a role in the context of almost every entitlement. Indeed, once attention is paid to the problem of general indeterminacy, it is hard
to think of any entitlement with regard to which the WMC is determinate.
3. Non-Neutrality and Indeterminacy-The reader has presumably already noticed the correspondence between the two
sources of bias and the two kinds of indeterminacy that have been
delineated in this paper. Generally speaking, bias and indeterminacy are two ways to approach the same phenomenon-the phenomenon that the WM allocation of entitlements is likely to be a
function of the presumed initial assignment. Before the presumption about the initial assignment is chosen we view the problem as
one of indeterminacy: the result of the WMC depends on that
choice. Once the initial assignment is chosen, the WMC obviously
becomes determinate. However, the very same problem-that the
WMC is a function of the chosen initial assignment-may lead us
to regard the WMC as biased (against the group that is disfavored
by the choice of initial assignment).
The bias arising from the use of willingness to pay (rather than
asking price) corresponds to the problem of self-indeterminacy.
They both relate to the possible divergence between offer and asking prices for a given entitlement, and are limited to those
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entitlements where the associated wealth effect is sufficiently large
to affect their own WM allocation. 38
The bias arising from the mere use of monetary valuations and the
problem of general indeterminacy, which were introduced in this
paper, again correspond to each other. They both reflect the fact that
the WM assignment of entitlements depends on the total distribution
of wealth-that is, on the initial assignment of entitlements as
a whole.
B. Fundamental Entitlements: Why Dworkin Was Right
One of Posner's arguments in favor of the WMC was that it assigns fundamental rights (e.g., to life, liberty, labor) in a way which
is in accord with widely shared ethical intuitions. 39 This proposition led to a debate between Dworkin, 4 Kronman,41 and Posner,42
regarding the application of the WMC to fundamental entitlements. Dworkin's two related claims were: 1) The WMC is indeterminate with regard to such entitlements, and 2) The application
of the WMC to such entitlements may well produce results which
contradict our moral beliefs.
The previous subsection has demonstrated that for any given
entitlement, even one of marginal value, the result of the WMC is
likely to depend on the presumed initial assignment. The indeterminacy of the WMC is particularly obvious with regard to
entitlements that are of consumptive use. All this also applies, of
course, to those entitlements we view as fundamental. Moreover,
since such entitlements are characterized by their significant value,
we are likely to have not only general indeterminacy but self-indeterminacy as well-a "Scitovsky Paradox" may well appear.
I nevertheless pay here particular attention to the case of fundamental rights because the Posner-Dworkin debate seems
unresolved. I believe this is due to the specific example of slavery
on which the debate focused. Dworkin argued that if the
entitlement of A's labor is initially assigned to B, the WMC is
38. Recall Dworkin's suggestion, page 681 supra, to restrict ourselves to those
entitlements where both tests-the one applying offer prices as well as that utilizing
asking prices-yield the same result. This means that we limit ourselves to those
entitlements where self-indeterminacy, and consequently also the corresponding
kind of bias, does not exist.
39. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics and Legal Theory, supra note 1, at 125-28.
40. Dworkin, supra-note 20, at 207-11.
41. Kronman, supra note 36, at 240-41.
42. Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 500-02.
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likely to maintain this state of slavery. Posner responded that A's
willingness to pay for his labor (based on his ability to borrow
against his future labor income) will be still greater than B's. The
entitlement to A's labor is of both consumptive and productive use
to A, and only of productive use to B. Posner indeed asserted
that the maximal productive value of A's labor is greater when he
is free than under slavery. Thus the debate remained undecided,
depending on disputed factual assertions. Posner, conceding that
"the theoretical possibility exists that efficiency might dictate slavery or some other monstrous right assignment," insisted that "it is
difficult to give examples where this would actually happen," and
concluded that "it is possible to deduce a structure of rights congruent with our ethical intuitions from the wealth maximization
premise."43

The invalidity of Posner's position becomes immediately apparent if we examine a fundamental entitlement which is solely of
consumptive use. Take, for instance, an example of fundamental
entitlement suggested by Posner himself 44 -the right to determine
one's sexual partners. Consider an initial assignment in which
Agatha is poor, while Sir George, who is very attracted to her, is
rich. Assume that Sir George is initially assigned an entitlement to
Agatha's sexual companionship. Obviously, the WMC is very likely
to retain this state, generally viewed as unacceptable. For one
thing, Agatha's willingness to pay is necessarily very limited since
borrowing is not possible-the entitlement is of consumptive use
and will not produce dollars to repay the loan.
It is clear that for every fundamental entitlement which is
solely or mainly of consumptive use, the possibility of the WMC
assigning it in conflict with our moral intuition is very real indeed.
The entitlement will not be assigned to the party who should hold
it according to our moral intuition if he is very poor in the presumed initial wealth distribution.
V.

ThE CONSENT ARGUMENT

A. Posner's Consent Argument
The position that Posner held at first 45 was that a wealth
increasing change is just and desirable in itself-a bigger pie is
43. Id. at 502.
44. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 1, at 125.
45. See generally id.
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preferable per se. Now Posner abandons this view to defend the
application of the WMC with a consent argument. 4 6 I present below that version of the argument which asserts that the application
of the WMC produces no ex ante losers. In the next subsection I
will consider the version in which ex ante losers do exist, but are
few in number.
The consent argument can be viewed as composed of the two
following propositions.
PropositionI-The WM assignment of any given common-law
entitlement at a given time is, judged ex ante, Pareto superior to
any alternative assignment.
Proposition Il-Given proposition I, the application of the
WMC to common-law entitlements is just and desirable.
Proposition I addresses the way in which a WM assignment at
a given time was viewed by individuals in some previous situation.
The ex ante situation is not a hypothetical situation but an actual
one which existed before the occurrence of some events. 47 Take a
model entitlement X and a point in time T. Let Y be the rule
which dictates a WM assignment of X at time T. (Y applies only to
T.) Proposition I asserts that there exists a previous point in time,
say To, in which no individual who may be affected by Y in the future would perceive any alternative rule as preferable to Y. In the
context of automobile accidents, the assertion is that before any
given period of time, when the identity of the accidents' victims in
that period is not yet known, no individual will prefer a non-WM
rule to apply to the accidents of that period.
Posner's rationale for proposition II is presumably the following. Given proposition I, the adoption in period T, of the WM rule
Y, which applies only to T, would have enjoyed the consent of all
individuals. Unfortunately, rule Y was not adopted at To. Nevertheless, suggests Posner, and this is the problematic part of the
reasoning, since the adoption of Y at To could be based on consent,
it follows that we are justified in adopting Y at T.
B.

Critique

Below I point out the problems with and objections to the described consent argument, explaining why this essay focuses on
only one of them.
46.

See generally Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1.

47. Posner's ex ante situation is one of "actual people deploying actual endowments of skill and energy and character." Id. at 499.
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1. Difficulties in Identifying a Kaldor-Hicks Improvement-A
recurring objection to the assignment of entitlements according to
the WMC is that assertions that a given change is a Kaldor-Hicks
(KH) improvement 4 8 are often questionable. 4 9 As the consent argument presumes that a given change composes a KH improvement,
this objection is indeed a preliminary one: it proposes that the existence of the circumstances to which the consent argument applies
cannot be adequately verified.
Simplifying assumptions are usually necessary for the economic analysis of the impact of a given change. These assumptions
may put in doubt the conclusions of such analysis. Among the factors which are often ignored are: (1) external preferences-5 -that
is, preferences not for one's own goods and opportunities, 5 1 2)
second-best problems, 52 and 3) modification of prices by the con53
sidered change.
Those problems indeed require great caution when concluding
a given change to be a KH improvement. Such problems, however, vary in their magnitude with regard to different common-law
rules. A finding that a given change is a KH improvement should
thus be regarded as very doubtful in the context of certain rules,
but not in that of others. The application of the WMC to those
entitlements, with regard to which a KH improvement cannot be
verified satisfactorily, may well be inappropriate. However, the
dismissal of the WMC altogether is, I think, unwarranted. At any
rate, since this paper focuses on the consent argument, I will abstract from the described problem. I will assume that the WM
rules considered for adoption do compose a KH improvement over
alternative rules.
2. Proposition I-My rejection of proposition I and, consequently, of the consent argument, is based on the findings of section II. It has been demonstrated that, for most entitlements, a
48. The WMC is used as a substitute for the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See note 2
supra.
49. This view is represented in this issue by Rizzo, supra note 36.
50. The term external preferences is borrowed from Dworkin. R. DWOiRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 234 (1978).

51. See, e.g., Rizzo, supra note 36.
52. A change which seems to be a KH improvement when considered in a partial equilibrium context may prove not to be so in the general equilibrium framework. See, e.g., E. MISHAN, COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS 98-108 (2d ed. 1976).
53. When prices are altered by the examined change, the WMC cannot be used
to identify a K- improvement. See Samuelson, Evaluation of Real National Income,
OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS 1 (1950).
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WM assignment, even judged ex ante, does create losers, so that
proposition I is not valid.
Indeed Posner acknowledges that a WM rule does not compensate ex ante all individuals. 54 His formulation of proposition I
would assert only that most, not necessarily all, individuals judge
ex ante a WM rule as no worse than any alternative rule. However, if proposition I is thus formulated, it seems to me that proposition II cannot be established. I see no plausible way to defend by
a consent argument a WM rule on the ground that ex ante the losers are fewer in number than the gainers. At any rate, it has been
pointed out in section II that the number of ex ante losers from a
WM rule may well be large. Therefore, I can abstract from the
question whether, for the sake of justifying the adoption of a WM
rule, the existence of few losers is as good as that of none.
3.

Proposition H--Having rejected proposition I, Posner's

consent argument can be dismissed. I shall, however, consider
proposition II in order to defend it, in part, against Dworkin's criticism. 55 My purpose in doing so is to prepare the ground for the re-

fined consent argument. To examine proposition II, I assume that
proposition I is correct.
Assume that the negligence rule is now found to be the WM
rule for automobile accidents. It then seems indisputably right to
adopt the following rule: the negligence rule will be applied tofuture accidents. Given proposition I, no one is made worse off by
establishing such a rule. The adoption of such a rule therefore can
be based on both consent and utilitarian grounds. What is more
problematic is the choice of rule for past accidents. At present
there are pending before our courts claims regarding accidents
from, say, the last ten years, and more such claims may still be
submitted. Ten years ago it would have been right to adopt the
negligence rule for those (then considered future) accidents. This,
however, was not done. Would we, nevertheless, be right in now
adopting the negligence rule for past accidents, although there is
no present consent for that? Dworkin answers this question in the
negative.
A judge can establish the negligence rule only by stating, in
the course of a decision he makes in a case, that rule to be the prevailing law. If the negligence rule is to be adopted now by judicial
decision it will therefore apply not only to future accidents but to
54. See Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 495.
55. Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980).
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past ones as well (including, of course, the case in which the decision for negligence is made). Dworkin's objection to the use of the
WMC by judges can be represented by the two following consecutive propositions: (i) it is not right to adopt now the WM rule for
past accidents, and (ii) the objective of having the WM rule apply
to future accidents does not justify its adoption now if the rule will
necessarily apply to past accidents as well (even though past accidents will be dealt with only for a limited period).
Even granting Dworkin both his propositions, they do not preclude the use of the WMC, but rather limit the scope of its use
and the institutions that may employ it. Dworkin considered the
WMC solely as a possible criterion for judges in deciding hard
cases. 56 The concern of this paper is, however, with the assignment of common-law entitlements according to the WMC in general, and not solely with assignment by the courts. 57 Judges cannot
establish a rule which applies only to future accidents, but the legislature can. Dworkin's criticism thus requires, at the most, that
the use of the WMC should be restricted to the legislature in
adopting forward-looking WM rules. Therefore, his position presumably suggests a greater role for the legislature in shaping the
common law, so that the benefits of such rules may be realized. 58
C.

Refinement: The Argument for a
Wealth Maximizing Policy

The conclusion of the previous subsection is that the most serious obstacle to the use of a WM rule (assuming it has been
verified as such), at least prospectively, is the fact that the rule is
likely, even judged ex ante, to produce losers. The refinement discussed below is an effort to remedy that problem. The idea is simple: the attractive ex ante Pareto superiority, which a single WM
rule lacks, may exist with regard to a policy of consistent application of the WMC.
. The refined consent argument defends the adoption of a policy, to which I will refer as WM policy, but not single applications
of that policy. Under one version of the WM policy all commonlaw entitlements are examined (say, in random order) and identi56. "It is, after all, just in such hard cases that we need a theory of adjudication
like the theory Posner proposes." Id. at 581.
57. Posner has a similar approach. See Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at
505-06.
58. Of course, the search for and the consequent identification of a WM rule
can be initiated by a hard case. Whatever decision the court reaches in that case, the
legislature may adopt the WM rule prospectively.
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fled WM rules are adopted. Under a weaker version of the WM
policy, and for the sake of my discussion there is no need to distinguish between the two versions, the WM rules are adopted
only prospectively. 5 9
The argument for the WM policy is based on the following
proposition, which can be viewed as a refinement of proposition I
in Posner's argument: a WM policy is ex ante a Pareto
improvement-that is, the adoption of the policy makes nobody
(would Posner say only few people?) worse off. The validity of that
proposition will be examined in the following section.
To determine whether the adoption of the WM policy makes
anybody worse off, a baseline-that is, a standard of comparison-is obviously necessary. If the adoption of the policy is to be
based on consent grounds the appropriate baseline is, I suggest,
the assignment of common-law entitlements to which individuals
are entitled according to an underlying political theory. In the following section I will explain the appropriateness of such a baseline,
and discuss some of the forms it may arguably take. One form
which will be examined is the present assignment of common-law
entitlements.
It should be noted that we may also seek to base the adoption
of the WM policy on utilitarian grounds. The appropriate baseline
for that purpose is presumably the present assignment of commonlaw entitlements. If the adoption of the policy benefits some individuals and makes none worse off in comparison to the present assignment, then that adoption increases utility and is therefore
arguably desirable. The inquiry to follow concerns itself with
the consent basis of the WM policy. Nevertheless, the possibility
of an utilitarian basis will be tested indirectly, since one of the
baselines to be examined is the present assignment of common-law
entitlements.
The kind of argument presented above for a WM policy has a
long history. The idea of consistently applying some criterion for
social changes because the adoption of such policy is to everybody's
benefit, notwithstanding the fact that any accepted change may
well produce losers, goes back to Edgworth. 60 Edgworth sought to
base the principle of utility on consent grounds, suggesting that a
59. Under a third version of the WM policy, the consistent application of the
WMC is limited to future hard cases. That is, prevailing non-WM rules are not to be
changed.
60. See F. EDGWORTH, MATHEMATICAL PsYcmcs 52-56 (1888).
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policy of maximizing total utility on each occasion is expected to
produce the greatest utility for each individual. 6 ' The appearance
of the KH criterion in this context is associated with Hicks6 2 and
Hotelling,6 3 who advocated the consistent application of that criterion with regard to economic activities. As regards legal rules, the
refined consent argument for a WM policy was suggested by
Michelman, 64 and is pointed out by several participants in this issue.65 Although Posner does not make this argument, once the
likely existence of ex ante losers from any given WM rule is acknowledged, it is a logical extension of his own argument. Indeed
the refined consent argument to be discussed is the most plausible
one which can be made for a WM common law.
Finally, the considered argument has also had its critics. In
particular, I wish to note Little's arguments against the policy advocated by Hicks of consistent application of the KH criterion. 6 6
However, the possibility that such a policy is non-neutral and, consequently, that its expected impact with regard to some group of
individuals is negative, a possibility that will be at the focus of my
inquiry, has not, as far as I know, been explored before.
VI.

CONSISTENT APPLICATION OF

A.

THE WMC

The Policy to be Considered

Before considering whether consent to the adoption of the

WM policy exists, we should specify the following: (1) the set of
entitlements to which the policy will apply, and (2) the initial assignment of entitlements to which the WMC is to be applied.
1. The Entitlements Domain of the Policy-Posner suggests
the application of the WMC to common-law rules. The common
61. Note that the two suggested reasons for the bias of the WMC do not exist
with regard to the criterion of maximizing total utility. This criterion, however, as is
well known, is inapplicable due to the impossibility of measuring utility.
62. See Hicks, The Rehabilitation of Consumers' Surplus, 8 REv. ECON. STUD.

108, 108-16 (1941).
63. See Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation
and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242, 242-69 (1938).

64. Michelman, Microeconomic Appraisal of ConstitutionalLaw: A Methodological Preface, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
(D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979).
65. See Tullock, Two Kinds of Legal Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 659, 664
(1980); Dworkin, supra note 55, at 584-90.
66. I. M.D. LITTLE, CRITIQUE OF WELFARE ECONOMICS, ch. VI (2d ed. 1957). Little's arguments were applied by John Rawls against Edgworth's position. See J.
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 170-71 (1971).
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law, of course, does not administer all entitlements in society. In
particular, I wish to point out that the WM policy to be considered
does not apply to taxation of labor and capital income, estates, and

bequests. 67
I assume that we are determined, regardless of what the
WMC may suggest, not to assign the entitlement to one's labor to
any other private party (slavery), but to vest it in the individual
himself (subject to possible taxation). Therefore, since such an allocation of the entitlement to one's labor may not be altered by the
WMC, that entitlement should not be considered as belonging to
the domain of the WM policy. At any rate, granting Posner that
the WMC assigns that entitlement in the way we are determined
to assign it anyway, 68 we still have no reason to apply the WMC to
other entitlements: such a policy should be defended oil its own
merit. The described reasoning applies not only to the entitlement
to one's labor but also to some other fumdamental entitlements. I
particularly refer to the entitlement to one's labor because of the
major impact it has on the distribution of wealth.
Henceforth I will use the term common-law entitlements, with
regard to which the WM policy is considered, as not including the
entitlements to individuals' labor and presumably some other fundamental entitlements. 69 By non-common-law entitlements I will
refer to all entitlements which are not common-law entitlements as
defined above. The distribution of wealth is determined in large
measure by the way in which non-common-law entitlements are
administered. For one thing, they include the*entitlements to individuals' labor and the tax system, which are the major factors
shaping that distribution. As the non-common-law entitlements are
not to be allocated by the WM policy, I assume that we have some
67. Indeed, to the extent that taxation has a redistributive goal, the use of the
WMC, which does not take into account such an objective, is obviously inappropriate. Consider, for example, a tax aimed solely at redistribution: the WMC will suggest that such tax be eliminated altogether in order to save the redistribution costs.
68. See section IV-B supra.
69. Recall that in section II-B supra, I already excluded from the scope of common-law entitlements, for the sake of the present discussion, those entitlements with
regard to which the WM rule does not create ex ante losers. Such WM rules may exist, I suggested, in the context of parties who are in contractual relations. The adoption of any such rule, at least prospectively, may be appropriate on its own merit.
However, such a rule may be adopted independently of a WM policy for other
entitlements. Therefore, the benefits of such a rule cannot be used to justify that policy. What needs to be examined is thus whether a WM policy for entitlements whose
WM assignments do create ex ante losers (entitlements which compose the great majority of the common law) is appropriate.
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other political theory for their assignment. I also assume that the
non-common-law entitlements are allocated at present in accord
with that political theory, or, alternatively, that the considered
WM policy is to be followed subsequent to their allocation in such
a way. Indeed all that the preceding analysis presumes is that our
normative inquiry is limited to common-law entitlements-that is,
when considering the adoption of the WM policy, the assignment
of non-common-law entitlements is not disputed.
2. The Initial Assignment of Entitlements-The WM assignment of any given common-law entitlement may well depend, as
has been explained above, on the distribution of wealth, which in
turn depends on the initial assignment of both common-law and
non-common-law entitlements. For practical reasons, 70 we have
no choice but to use the present assignment of entitlements as the
initial assignment to which the considered WM policy is to be
applied.
The allocation of common-law entitlements that will evolve
from the WM policy considered for adoption is thus shaped by the
present distribution of wealth. The present distribution of wealth
is mainly determined by the allocation of non-common-law
entitlements. I assume that these entitlements are administered according to some liberal political theory. All liberal political theories
administer the entitlements to individuals' labor and the tax system
in a way that results in wealth inequality (although such theories
may differ in the extent of this inequality). As regards the present
assignment of common-law entitlements, it can mitigate (but presumably not eliminate) or increase the inequality in wealth arising
from the allocation of non-common-law entitlements. The allocation
of common-law entitlements that the WM policy will produce depends, at any rate, on the overall distribution of wealth and not on
its components. 71 Whatever the effect of the present assignment of
common-law entitlements on the overall wealth distribution, the
overall distribution is presumably an unequal one.
Finally, since the WM assignment of a given common-law
entitlement may depend on the allocation of other common-law
70. For most entitlements, it will not be possible to assess the parties'
valuations of the entitlement (and therefore the WM assignment of the entitlement)
under some hypothetical initial assignment.
71. The present assignment of common law entitlements is of significance,
aside from its impact on the overall distribution of wealth, only when it serves as the
baseline to which the outcome of the WM policy is to be compared. See section
VI-D infra.
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entitlements, the WM policy must follow (at least in part) a piecemeal approach. Therefore, the outcome of the policy is affected
also by the order in which common-law entitlements are examined
and, if dictated by the WMC, reallocated. 72 To abstract from this
problem, I assume that under the WM policy entitlements are ex73
amined in a random order.
B.

The Necessity of a Theory of Underlying Entitlements

The consent argument for the WM policy is, as has already
been suggested, incomplete unless a baseline--that is, the alternative allocation of common-law entitlements individuals face if
they do not consent to the adoption of the policy-is specified.
First, the baseline is used to deduce the individuals' consent. If
the adoption of the policy makes nobody worse off in comparison to
the baseline, then, it is argued, everyone would consent to that
adoption were he asked, and consent may therefore be inferred.
Second, the value we attach to the individuals' consent depends on
the alternative with which they are faced if they do not consent.
An individual will presumably consent when faced with a baseline
in which no entitlement' is assigned to him. Such consent, however, may not have much of a normative significance.
It is implicit, I suggest, in the consent argument that individuals have a right to reject the WM policy and have instead the
baseline. Otherwise, if they did not have such a right, their
consent would not have been sought. That is, the baseline used by
the consent argument is necessarily one to which individuals are
presumed to be entitled.
Therefore, one who advances the consent argument necessarily holds some underlying political theory that provides the
baseline to which individuals are entitled if they do not consent to
the WM policy. To provide such a baseline, the political theory
must be one which acknowledges inviolability of individuals (in
contrast, for example, to utilitarian theories). The baseline provided by the political theory will be referred to as the fundamental
72. Every individual will prefer that the WM policy first examine those
entitlements which are not presently assigned to him and which may be expected to
be reallocated to him by the WMC. That will increase his wealth and therefore enhance his chances of being assigned entitlements that will be examined later on.
73. If the order of examination is not random, then there may be another bias
involved in the WM policy, in addition to the two biases that this section will discuss. The treatment of such a bias, however, is beyond the scope of this paper; its
possible existence and implications will be dealt with in another paper.
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or underlying rights individuals have regarding the allocation of
common-law entitlements. The underlying rights individuals have
may not be to some completely specified allocation of common-law
entitlements but rather to some principles to which that allocation
should adhere.
The baseline dictated by the underlying political theory may
or may not overlap with the present assignment of common-law
entitlements. Thus the consent on which the adoption of the WM
policy is argued to be based may be actual (albeit unexpressed) or
counterfactual--depending on whether the baseline used is the actual present allocation of common-law entitlements or a hypothetical allocation. 74 In both cases, granting that the baseline utilized is
accepted as appropriate (that is, as indeed representing the fundamental rights individuals possess), the consent has a normative significance.
I wish now to describe the way in which the WM policy is expected, according to the consent argument, to produce an allocation of common-law entitlements which is Pareto-superior to the
baseline provided by a given underlying political theory.
Assume that common-law entitlements were actually allocated
according to the baseline. A given entitlement might well then be
assigned (according to the underlying political theory) to the party
other than the one to whom the entitlement is more valuable. That
is, potential gains from exchange would exist. If such an exchange
took place, it would (i) transfer the entitlement to the party to
whom it is more valuable, and (ii) fully compensate the initial assignee of the entitlement. If transactions were costless, we would
without doubt adopt the baseline. All potential gains from exchange would then be realized by a process of smooth exchanges.
Transaction costs, however, do exist, and they either are incurred
or inhibit potentially beneficial exchanges from taking place. Thus,
exchanges cannot be relied on to fully realize the potential gains
from trade in entitlements.
Therefore, it is argued, individuals consent to give up their
rights to the baseline and to assign entitlements according to the
74. If the baseline is different from the present assignment of common law
entitlements, the consent on which the adoption of the policy is argued to be based
is one which would be given in a hypothetical situation. In that hypothetical situation common-law entitlements are allocated in accord with the baseline; noncommon-law entitlements are allocated in the same way as at present, since their
present allocation is assumed to be in accord with the political theory we hold regarding them.
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WMC in an effort to imitate, at least to some satisfactory degree,
the allocation that will emerge in the absence of transaction costs if
the baseline is adopted. The WM policy assigns every entitlement
to the party to whom it is more valuable-that is, the party who
would hold it in the absence of transaction costs. 75 However, unlike exchange, the WM policy does not directly compensate a party
to whom a given entitlement is assigned in the baseline but not in
the allocation produced by the policy. Such a party is to be compensated by the receipt of some entitlements which are assigned in
the baseline to some other parties. Whether such a compensation
can be expected to be sufficient will be dealt with in the following
subsections.
Finally, having found that the consent argument for a WM
policy necessarily relates to a baseline provided by an underlying
political theory, two consequences immediately follow. First, a
WM policy is not necessarily incompatible, as it may seem, with
theories which recognize individuals' rights as trumps overriding
any considerations of general welfare. On the contrary, if a WM
policy, however refined and constrained, is to be adopted on
consent grounds (as noted above, a utilitarian basis may also be
sought), a rights theory must be presumed.
Second, different political theories may vary in the baselines
they provide. Therefore, different versions of the consent argument
may exist, differing in the baseline they utilize. The adoption of
the WM policy may make nobody worse off in comparison to one
baseline, but not to another. Whether one accepts any version of
the consent argument depends not only on whether he finds the
deduction of consent, given the used baseline, persuasive, but also
on whether one shares the conception of individuals' rights repre75. The WM policy will assign a model entitlement to the party that will hold
it in the absence of transaction costs given the present distribution of wealth. The
present distribution of wealth may differ (if the baseline differs from the present allocation of common law entitlements) from the distribution of wealth that would obtain were the baseline adopted. The WM policy may thus assign the entitlement to
the party other than the one which would have it if the baseline were adopted and
transactions were costless. Recall, however, that the distribution of wealth is mainly
determined by non-common-law entitlements, which are assumed to be allocated at
present in accord with the political theory we hold regarding them. Therefore, we
can assume that the above two wealth distributions are sufficiently similar so that the
WMC will give the same result when applied to either of them. Under that assumption the WM policy is bound to produce an overall benefit in comparison to the
baseline, and the only question is whether everyone can be expected to benefit from
that surplus or at least to be compensated for the entitlements he will lose. If that assumption is not correct, the mere existence of such a surplus is questionable.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1980

29

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [1980], Art. 9
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8: 671

sented by that baseline. At any rate, the adoption of the WM policy suggested by Posner does not, as will be shown, compose a
Pareto improvement over any plausible baseline.
C. The Symmetric Baseline
1. The Baseline Introduced-The symmetric baseline described below is, I suggest, the baseline most congruent to
Posner's approach. This baseline may also have an appeal to some
readers because of its seemingly egalitarian nature. However, I will
later point out that the egalitarianism of this baseline is very limited.
How would Posner allocate common-law entitlements if WM
rules could not be based on consent? Take the automobile accidents example. Posner supported the negligence rule solely because it was assumed to be the WM rule. Were the WMC
dictating assignment of the considered entitlement to pedestrians,
Posner would undoubtedly advocate such an allocation. That is,
Posner's approach does not have any a priori preference between
drivers and pedestrians. Neither drivers nor pedestrians are conceived to have, on the fundamental level, a stronger claim for the
considered entitlement. In Posner's words: "I assumed that the victim of an accident had some kind of moral claim to compensation
even though the injury was not at fault. But one could equally well
assume that people have a right not to be hampered in their activities by being made liable for accidents that they could not have
prevented at reasonable cost." 76
The underlying political theory which arises from a generalization of Posner's described approach holds that, for any given common-law entitlement X, the parties between which the entitlement
is to be allocated, A and B, have on the fundamental level an
equally strong right to that entitlement. The baseline provided by
such a political theory will be referred to as the symmetric
baseline.
There may be more than one way to assign the given
entitlement X in accord with the considered political theory. First,
assuming X is divisible, we may divide it equally between A and
B. Second, assuming that there is more than one entitlement to be
allocated between A and B, we may assign to each party half of
those entitlements. The specific entitlements to be allocated to
each party will be randomly determined. Third, we may randomly
76.

Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 496.
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choose one of the parties A and B and assign the entitlement to
him. For the purpose of the discussion to follow, there is no need
to distinguish between the different possible versions of the symmetric baseline. I will therefore assume for simplicity that all common-law entitlements are divisible and that in the symmetric
baseline each entitlement is equally divided between the relevant
parties.
2. WM Common Law v. the Symmetric Baseline-The expected outcome of the WM policy can now be compared to the
symmetric baseline. The model entitlement X, which in the symmetric baseline is equally divided between the parties A and B,
will be wholly assigned by the WM policy to the party with the
higher monetary valuation of the entitlement, say A. That is, in
comparison to the symmetric baseline, the policy will reallocate B's
part of entitlement X to A. Individuals represented by party A are
made better off and those represented by party B worse off by
such a reallocation, and the gains of the first group exceed the
losses of the latter. The WM policy will produce such
reassignments in comparison to the symmetric baseline with regard
to every common-law entitlement.
To examine whether everyone's consent to such a series of
reallocations can be deduced, consider first the following analogy.
Agatha and Sir George are asked to participate in a multi-round
game. In every round one of them will be chosen the winner and
will receive $6, while the other will pay $4, the deficit being financed by the organization sponsoring the game. Every round will
thus increase the combined wealth of Agatha and Sir George by
$2. That, however, does not assure that they both will consent to
take part in the game, even ignoring their possible risk aversion.
Each person's consent obviously depends on his chance of being
the winner in a given round of the game. Suppose, for instance,
that the odds of Agatha winning a given round are less than forty
percent. Agatha will not agree to participate in the game (even if
she is risk-neutral): her expected payoff is negative.
Do all individuals who will be affected by a given "round" of
the WM policy face a priori the same odds of being on the losing
side? The WM policy will be applied with the background of the
present distribution of wealth, which is, whenever non-commonlaw entitlements are administered according to some liberal political theory, unequal. It has been demonstrated that the WMC,
when applied in the presence of wealth inequality, is biased against
the poor. That is, when affected by the WM policy, poor individu-
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als have, in general, greater chances of being on the losing side
than wealthy individuals. In particular, some poor individuals'
chances of losing in a given "round" of the WM policy affecting
them may well be sufficiently large so that, in comparison to the
symmetric baseline, the expected impact of that policy on these individuals is negative. To phrase the argument differently, the bias
of the WMC against the poor suggests that in the expected allocation under the WM policy poor individuals are assigned, on the average, less that half of the entitlements to which they relate. In
particular, some poor individuals may well be better off under the
77
symmetric baseline than under such expected allocation.
The number of poor individuals on whom the expected impact
of the WM policy is negative depends on the following factors: the
ratio between the efficiency gains and the distributional transfer involved in every round of the WM policy, the extent to which the
distribution of wealth is unequal, and the frequency with which
there is wealth asymmetry between the groups of individuals engaged in two consumptive activities between which an entitlement
is to be allocated.
In sum, the position of some groups of poor individuals is
worse off under the WM policy than under the symmetric baseline
due to the fact that the WMC gives to their preferences less
weight than to those of wealthier individuals. Posner makes it plain
that he indeed does not wish to give much weight to preferences of
poor individuals, at least those who have no wealth at all.78 Such

an approach, however, cannot be based on the consent of those
poor individuals.
D. The Status Quo Baseline
I will below examine the expected outcome of the WM policy
in comparison to the assignment of common-law entitlements present at the time when the adoption of that policy is considered. I
will refer to that standard of comparison as the status quo baseline
(SQB). Although the SQB seems to have some initial appeal, I will
later argue that the SQB is not an appropriate baseline for the
consent argument.
The SQB cannot be specified for all common-law entitlements.
77. Some other poor individuals may still be better off in the expected allocation under the WM policy if the entitlements assigned to them, although fewer in
number, are more valuable to them than those they are assigned in the symmetric
baseline.
78. See Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 1, at 499; see also text accompanying
notes 25-27 supra.
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The present allocation of some entitlements, namely those regarding which hard cases may arise, is unknown. Therefore, the SQB
may be used as a baseline only for that part of the WM policy
which examines entitlements whose present allocation is known,
and reallocates them if that is suggested by the WMC. The
discussion below is thus limited to a WM policy regarding such
entitlements. To examine the application of the WMC to hard
cases, obviously a different baseline must be used.
Common-law entitlements may at present be allocated in different ways, and I do not want to restrict the forms that the SQB
may take. Nevertheless, as the expected impact of the WM policy
relative to the symmetric baseline has been already considered, we
can assume that the SQB is asymmetric. The SQB being asymmetric, there is some group of individuals, A, who are favored, possibly to different degrees, in the present assignment of common-law
entitlements. The present allocation may, for example, systematically favor individuals who maintain some given style of life, or
have some given preferences or values. 79 I hasten to add that if a
given individual is more favorably treated in the SQB than another
one, it does not follow that he is also wealthier, since the distribution of wealth is mainly determined by non-common-law entitlements.8 0 That is, the extent to which an individual is favored or
disfavored in the SQB need not correlate with his ranking in the
distribution of wealth. That part of the total wealth which is attributable to common-law entitlements may well be distributed differently from the total wealth.
Assume for the moment that the WMC is not biased against
the poor or against any other group. Taking a model entitlement X
and two individuals affected by it, one belonging to class A and one
not, ve are assuming that both individuals have an equal chance
79. The present allocation may, of course, be biased with regard to more than
one characteristic of individuals. Consequently, there may be some classes of individuals who receive a more favorable or unfavorable treatnent, and a given individual may belong to more than one class. The bias represented by the group A should
be viewed as an aggregation of all those biases.
80. Suppose, for instance, that the present allocation favors a quiet way of life,
or, more specifically, quiet at night. Under such allocation the brain surgeon who is
a night-parties fan is poorer than under the symmetric baseline: he will have to
spend more of his income if he wants to keep his night habits. In contrast, the unskilled worker who sleeps at night is wealthier under such allocation than under the
symmetric baseline. Nevertheless, as long as non-common-law entitlements are allocated in accord with some liberal political theory, the brain surgeon is presumably
still at the upper part and the unskilled worker at the lower part of the wealth distribution.
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that the WMC will assign X to their benefit. However, it is more
likely that X is at present allocated to the benefit of the individual
belonging to A, than to that of the other individual. Therefore, if
the WM policy will reallocate X in comparison to its present assignment, the individual belonging to A is more likely to lose from
that reallocation than the other individual. That is, individuals who
are favored in the SQB have, in general, greater odds of losing
from reallocations that the WM policy will produce, and the more
favored an individual in the present allocation, the greater his odds
of losing."s In particular, the chances of some given individuals
who belong to A to be on the losing side from reallocations to
which the WM policy will lead may well be sufficiently large so
that the expected impact of that policy on those individuals is
negative.
To phrase the argument differently, if the WMC is neutral everyone has the same expectations regarding the size of the slice he
will have from the bigger pie that the WM policy will produce.
However, if the present pie is unequally divided, some individuals
may have at present a bigger slice than the one they are expected
to have in the increased pie. In sum, comparing the WM policy to
the SQB, we find, not surprisingly, that the policy is biased against
those individuals favored in the present allocation simply because
they lose more from the mere decision to reexamine common-law
entitlements disregarding their present assignment. Consequently,
the adoption of that policy may make some of those individuals
worse off than their present position, to which they are presumed,
if the SQB is used as a baseline, to have a fundamental right.
We can now incorporate in the analysis the non-neutrality of
the WMG-that is, the fact that the prospects of poor individuals
regarding the expected allocation under the WM policy are worse
than those of others. Thus two biases are involved in the reallocations that the WM will produce in the present allocationagainst poor individuals, and against individuals favored in the SQB
(say, those engaged in some activities which are favored by the
present allocation).
Both biases work against an individual who is both poor (as
mainly determined by the value of non-common-law entitlements
assigned to him) and a beneficiary of the asymmetry of the SQB.
81.

Consider, for example, an individual who is at present assigned every

entitlement to which he is a party. Obviously, he cannot but lose from any realloca-

tion to which the WM policy will lead.
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His chances of being assigned by the WMC entitlements affecting
him are smaller than those of others while he is more likely to be
a present assignee of those entitlements. Both facts make him a
more likely loser from reallocations produced by the WM policy.
He gives up a bigger slice of the pie than others do, while his expected slice is smaller than theirs. In contrast, both biases work in
favor of an individual who is both wealthy and disfavored by the
present allocation. Finally, the two biases mitigate each other to
some extent with regard to an individual who is poor, and disfavored in the SQB, or who is wealthy and favored in the SQB. In
sum, the expected impact of the WM policy in comparison to the
SQB may well be negative with regard to individuals who are
poor, or favored by the present allocation, or both.
Is it possible that the two described biases will cancel each
other with regard to every individual so that all individuals will
have the same chance to lose from WM reallocations of the present
assignment? For that to happen the wealth of every individual
must correlate with the extent to which he is favored by the present assignment in such a way that his relative advantage (disadvantage) regarding the assignment of entitlements by the WMC will
be equal to his relative advantage (disadvantage) with regard to the
present assignment. Thus, to argue that the adoption of the WM
policy makes nobody worse off in comparison to the SQB, one
must presume the present allocation of common-law entitlements
to be severely asymmetric in favor of the wealthy and symmetric
with regard to any other characteristic of individuals.
E. Uncertainty and Redistribution
I wish to briefly describe the way in which the analysis hitherto presented is affected by two additional factors-the existence
of uncertainty regarding the allocation that will evolve from the
WM policy, and the possibility of redistributing the benefits of that
policy.
1. Uncertainty-In considering whether consent exists for
the adoption of the WM policy I have thus far considered the expected impact of that policy. The actual allocation that the policy
will produce, and therefore the actual impact of its adoption, are
uncertain. First, the examination of every common-law entitlement
according to the WMC is a process with great informational and
computational demands whose accurate results cannot therefore be
predicted beforehand. Second, if the WM policy is to be maintained for some period, the WM assignments of some entitlements
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may well change with changes in factors such as individuals' preferences and production technologies.
Recall the game in which Agatha and Sir George were asked
to participate.8 2 Even if the expected payoffs of both Agatha and
Sir George are positive, one of them or both may not consent to
take part in the game because of risk aversion. The value riskaverse individuals attach to an uncertain payoff is equal to the expected payoff reduced by some risk premium. Thus, to examine
how the adoption of the WM policy is judged by a given individual, the expected impact of the policy on him should be adjusted
by an appropriate risk premium. The risk faced by the individual
(and the corresponding risk premium) would not be large if he
were to be affected by numerous WM reallocations each of very
small value to him. However, some WM rules may impose significant losses (even judged ex ante) on some of the individuals involved. Thus, even if the expected impact of the WM policy on
every individual were positive, some individuals would possibly
judge the adoption of the WM policy as making them worse off.83
The considered uncertainty is not, however, the only factor
which may cause individuals to judge the adoption of the WM policy as making them worse off. Rather, the uncertainty factor works
in addition to and combination with the bias[es] involved in the operation of the policy. Due to the non-neutrality of the policy, even
its expected impact may be negative with regard to some individuals. In addition to those individuals, there may be some other individuals who face a positive expected impact, but who, after taking
into account the uncertainty involved, view the policy as undesirable. The uncertainty regarding the accurate allocation to which
the WM policy will lead may thus increase the number of nonconsenting individuals.
2. Redistribution-IfAgatha and Sir George do not play the
game out of fear of losing, they miss a sure opportunity to increase
their combined wealth. They may therefore agree with each other
to play the game with a commitment to share the profits in a way
that will assure that neither of them loses from participating. Similarly, one might think that if the WM policy is bound to produce
82. See p. 701 supra.
83. Compare J. RAWLS, supra note 66, at 170-71. Rawls' rejection of Edgworth's
argument for a consistent application of the principle of utility is based on the risks
with which individuals are faced by such a policy. Of course, the risks involved in
the construction of the basic structure of society are significantly greater than those
involved in the allocation of common-law entitlements.
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gains in excess of losses, its adoption should not be withheld because it makes some group of individuals worse off. Rather, one
would argue, that problem can be addressed by a redistribution of
some of the benefits of the policy to those individuals.
I will not attempt in this paper to fully discuss the extent to
which redistribution can remedy the described defects of the WM
policy and the ways in which the policy has to be qualified and
limited for that purpose. I wish only to point out two apparent consequences of the need for redistribution to compensate individuals.
First, if redistribution is necessary in order for the adoption of
the WM policy not to make anyone worse off, then the consent
that may be argued to exist is not to the WM policy alone, but
only to such policy accompanied by an adequate redistribution. To
be based on consent, the WM policy must carry a commitment to
redistribution. The mere pursuit of a WM policy regarding common-law entitlements thus grants to some individuals rights to redistribution, in addition to and independent of any rights for redistribution they may have according to the political theory we hold
regarding non-common-law entitlements. One who advocates a
WM policy for common-law entitlements must therefore acknowledge a commitment to redistribution, even if his view with regard
to individuals' labor income, and to the administration of noncommon-law entitlements in general, does not require, or indeed
opposes any redistribution.
Second, redistribution is costly. Some WM reallocations may
require redistribution whose costs are in excess of the efficiency gains produced by the reallocation. The distributional consequences of a WM rule-whether it will necessitate the incurring of redistribution costs and the extent of such costs-must
be taken into account. That is, some form of tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution cannot be avoided when allocating
common-law entitlements, and the decision may at times be
against the WM rule.
F. Some Comments on the Appropriate Baseline
The comments below relate to the question whether either of
the two baselines that have been discussed above is appropriate for
the consent argument. Taking first the symmetric baseline, I wish
to point out, without making a judgment regarding the appropriateness of that baseline, that its egalitarianism is specious, or, at
most, seriously limited. The symmetric baseline dictates an equal
division of common-law entitlements, regardless of the way in
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which non-common-law entitlements are allocated. The baseline is
thus compatible with any overall wealth inequality that may arise
from non-common-law entitlements. In particular, the baseline is
compatible with a libertarian approach to non-common-law entitlements and with the resulting severe inequality in wealth. The
symmetric baseline does not therefore reflect any commitment
to or concern about overall wealth inequality, a concern which
characterizes a true egalitarian theory such as Rawls' Theory of
84
Justice.
Turning to the SQB, I wish to explain why I judge it to be an
inappropriate baseline for the consent argument. I do not see any
good reason why the status quo allocation, merely by virtue of being the present one, is the allocation to which individuals have a
fundamental right. We can, of course, hold the view that individuals are entitled to the particularallocation we now have because of
its features. But then its use as a baseline is due to those features
and not to the fact that it obtains at present, and the baseline
should therefore be defined in terms of those features. Finally,
granting Posner's positive claim that the present allocation of common-law entitlements is, at least in large measure, wealth maximizing, this does not justify the use of the present allocation
as a baseline but merely introduces a problem of circularity: to defend the preceding application of the WMC which produced the
present allocation, a baseline is again necessary.
Assume that the normatively appropriate baseline is N, which
differs from the SQB. The SQB may still be relevant for a positive
theory attempting to explain why a WM policy may be actually followed. Assume that the adoption of the WM policy composes a
Pareto improvement over SQB, but not over N. Although the
SQB, differing from N, is unjust, it may be hard as a matter of political reality to change the status quo in a way that worsens the situation of some group of individuals. Consequently, individuals who
are in a worse position under the present allocation than under N
may nevertheless compromise with reality, accept the status quo,
and judge alternatives by comparing them to the SQB. Therefore,
one could argue that the adoption of the WM policy, making nobody worse off than under the SQB, would actually enjoy the support of all individuals. The concern of this paper is, however, with
the normative claim for a WM policy. The WM policy is indeed
normatively preferable to the SQB, but it is not so with regard to
84.
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N. The actual support for the WM policy does not make it just,
since the supporting individuals are denied the alternative N to
which we presume they have a fundamental right. The WM policy
will be unjust; justice requires us to establish N. Thus, in deciding
whether the SQB should serve as a baseline for the consent argument, the relevant question is not whether in reality individuals
are likely to agree to an alternative more favorable than the status
quo, but only whether the present allocation is in accord with the
individuals' fundamental rights.
The above explains why I consider my inquiry of the impact of
a WM policy to be an incomplete one-the WM policy should be
examined also, I think, in light of additional baselines that may be
provided by various political theories. Such examination will, however, be pursued in another paper, together with the identification
for the different possible baselines of the ways in which a WM policy must be limited and qualified if its adoption is to make nobody
worse off in comparison to the baseline.
At any rate, we can already make a judgment with regard to
the WM policy suggested by Posner. In comparison to every
baseline but one, such a policy makes some group of individuals
worse off. The only exception, I have shown, is a baseline which is
asymmetric in favor of wealthy individuals to an extent correlating
with each individual's wealth, and symmetric with regard to any
other characteristic of individuals. And it is hard to imagine a plausible underlying political theory that will provide such a baseline.
G.

Conclusion

The WM policy suggested by Posner-a consistent, unqualified, and unlimited application of the WMC to all common-law
entitlements-can be rejected. It has been demonstrated that the
expected impact of such a policy in comparison to every plausible
baseline may well be negative with regard to some group of individuals.
I have already expressed, however, my belief that the application of the WMC to legal rules, appropriately qualified and constrained, is just and desirable. This essay has prepared the ground
for a future work that will identify those appropriate qualifications
and constraints. I have set forth the problems that work must address, and the lines along which it may proceed. An adequate
theory of the normative foundations and the limits of the economic
analysis of law is already long due.
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